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Abstract
In this paper, national identity is conceptualized in terms of competing representations of the
putative “nation” based on which socio-political contests unfold and bureaucracy functions.
Two key historical happenings marked the politics of national identity in West Malaysia: the
1969 racial riots and the Islamization policies. After 1969, comprehensive ethnic-based
preferential policies were formalized, while Malay political primacy justified on the basis of
indigeneity became entrenched. The Islamization Policy implemented from the 1980s
mainstreamed the idea of Malaysia as a negara Islam. Executive curtailment of judicial
autonomy led to institutional mutations dubbed by a scholar as the “silent re-writing of the
Constitution.”
During the 1990s, despite selected socio-cultural measures of “liberalization” more
accommodative of non-Malay interests, ethnic preferential treatments remained prevalent.
Moreover, the conflation of the logic of Malay primacy with that of Islamic supremacy in
institutional practices resulted in a rise in inter-religious contentions. Historic regime change
became conceivable following recent political development. Nonetheless, prospects for radical
revision of existing inter-religious dynamics remain dim because Islamic conservatism among
Malay politicians transcends party-lines.
Keywords: nationhood, Malay political primacy, Islamization, inter-religious relations.
Introduction
Historians pioneered studies on the historical emergence of nationalism and nation-building
efforts in Malaysia. One important historical study that lays the groundwork for studying the
problematic of Malaysian nationhood is the constitutional history examined by Joseph Fernando
[2002]. Complementary to historical studies are the works of social scientists such as Ratnam
[1965], Vasil [1980] and Heng [1988]. They discuss in considerable depth issues related to
citizenship and constitutional provisions, but position their work in the context of Malaysian
ethnic politics. The works of Hussin Mutalib [1990; 1993] examine extensively state
Islamization policies and the politics of the Islamic state till early 1990s. The evolving
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nationalist thinking of Dr. Mahathir, Malaysia’s longest serving Prime Minister, was dissected
carefully by Khoo [1995].
Other academic writings considering issues related to national identity and nationalism
include Sharon and Suryadinata [1981/82], Tan [1988], Lee [1990] and Muhammad Ikmal Said
[1996]. The latest journal articles or book chapters on Malaysian national identity explore
changing perspectives of the political or bureaucratic elites on national integration [Lee 2004;
Bunnell 2002; Case 2000; Khoo 2002; Ooi 2006], discourse analysis of the ideological construction
of Malay identity as subjects or a majority [Watson 1996; Shamsul 1996; Milner 1998; 2005], and
colonial roots of Malay identity and hence nationalism [Shamsul 1997; 1998].
There is nonetheless no scholarly work that examines the diachronic evolution of national
identity in terms of ideological contests of national representation and the implications of
bureaucratic practices informed by specific understandings of national identity. Moreover, the
government and the state institutions are assumed to be one and the same in most analyses of
Malaysian politics. This paper contends that there may be discrepancies between the two. I
wish to highlight the yawning gap of perspectives between divisive institutional practices
executed by state agents which have become entrenched over the decades and the impotence of
policy reforms initiated by political decision-makers in Malaysia. As a consequence, reform
programs or new orientation introduced by politician policy-makers may lose steam or be
subverted owing to the weight of institutional inertia. This was the case during the 1990s as
we shall see.
In this paper, national identity is conceptualized as competing representations of the
identity of an imagined political community called “nation.” Is Malaysia a Malay nation, or a
multiethnic nation? An Islamic state, or a “secular” state? These attributes are not innocent
concepts as they may serve as the ideological justifications for the way state institutions are run.
The idea of nation is dubbed an “essentially contested concept,” whereby a particular definition
may favor the interests and identity of one sub-national group over another [Calhoun 1997: 98].
Day-to-day bureaucratic dealings and decisions operate based on a tacit understanding of a
specific representation of the national identity.
Moreover, socio-political contests take place in the context of such an implicit apprehension
of the existing socio-political order which serves as the overall “structures of meaning.” Within
the national framework of political contestations, the contended national identity is a form of
relational identity [Duara 1996]. There is a tendency for the particular ethnic or interest
groups controlling the State to render themselves as the reference point of the cultural
foundation of the state in their formulation of nation-building programs [Williams 1989].
Malaysia is no exception.
In the case of Malaysia, religion forms an integral part of the ethnic identity of various
communities, especially for the Malays whom by constitutional definition are Muslims. By
asserting the superior position of Malay cultural (and religious) heritage in the national polity, as
was done for instance through the proclamation of the National Culture Policy in 1971, the
cultural and religious practices of other less empowered ethnic groups are accorded an
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“informal” and lesser status. Such symbolic assertion may be done explicitly through
discourses in the public sphere, or implicitly in routine bureaucratic practices performed by
state institutions. Both are sites of production of national identity which interact dialectically
but may involve different groups of socio-political actors.1)
Behind ongoing ethnic politics and implicit in day-to-day bureaucratic dealings, what is
implicated directly or indirectly may be the continued affirmation or attempted refutation of
existing official representations of the nation. By situating ethnic politics within a diachronic
context of the politics of national identity while taking into account of the synchronic ideological
orientation underlying mutations of state institutions, we are able to gain insights into the
Malaysian politics beyond its more immediate partisan struggle.
The national identity of a nation-state evolves over time. The existing dominant
representation of the national identity and the official forms of state institutions take stock of the
past negotiations and contentions among different social actors. In this analysis of the politics
of national identity, I am proposing that significant changes occurred at two stages: first
following the 1969 racial riots and secondly from the eighties following the implementation of
state-led Islamization policies. While events in 1969 led to a resurgent ideological assertion of
Malay supremacy in politics and its entrenchment in the functioning of state institutions, the
1980s saw a progressive “islamization” of state institutions as well as the mainstreaming of the
idea of Malaysia as negara Islam [Islamic country/state]. This has led to the co-existence of
two dominant ideological strands, one ethnic-oriented and the other, religiously-based. While
there may be differences and contradictions between the two discourses, they are arguably
variants originating from the same root: both are only justifiable if hinging on the argument of
indigeneity, and both are the fruits of and stem from the entrenchment of Malay political
primacy.
More than a year after the historic electoral results of March 8, 2008, and the political
ascendance of a more multiethnic-oriented Malay-based People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan
Rakyat, or simply, KeADILan) headed by Anwar Ibrahim, I argue in this paper that from the
point of view of the politics of national identity, significant shifts in political paradigms remain
hazy at this point in time.
The key to the core of Malaysian politics of national identity is the issue of Malay political
primacy. Malay political dominance is a fundamental reality of Malaysian politics, notwith-
standing the fact that the governing coalition since independence, the Alliance [subsequently
expanded to form the Barisan Nasional or literally, the “National Front”], is multiethnic in its
composition. Scholars differ in their assessment of the nature of Malay political primacy and
when exactly such primacy became entrenched. On one extreme of the spectrum, Tim Harper
[[1999]2001] thinks that the independence has rendered the Federation of Malaya a principally
Malay nation, which is historically ungrounded. The historical work of Joseph Fernando [2002]
and key official records subsequently made public have conclusively confirmed the ethnically
1) For a more elaborate discussion on my proposed theoretical perspective on national identity, cf. Ting
[2008].
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inclusive orientation the founding statesmen had intended the Federation of Malaya to be.
Most other scholars, on the other hand, regard the dynamics of Malay hegemony as a factual
observation and do not make such a far-fetched claim. John Funston [1980] who studied Malay
politics even argues that government policies before 1969 were more favorable to non-Malays
than Malays [ibid.: 294]. What is at stake in this discussion is the political basis based on which
Malay political primacy is justified, and the issue of the foundational national identity of Malaya,
and subsequently, Malaysia.
It may be argued that subsequent to the racial riots in 1969, there was a retrospective
attempt to re-interpret the issue of citizenship and the constitutional provisions of the special
position of the Malays as “based on the notion that Malaya was a Malay country and that it
belonged only to the Malays” [Vasil 1980: 37-38]. The term that captures and asserts this idea
of Malay ownership of Malaya, as used by ultra-Malay nationalists, is the term ketuanan Melayu.
Ketuanan Melayu has been variously understood or translated as Malay hegemony, Malay
political primacy, Malay sovereignty [kedaulatan Melayu] or Malay dominance. At the core of
this mindset is the belief that Malaya belonged to the Malay people, was a Malay polity and has
remained principally so despite colonialism and subsequently, independence. This provides
ideological justifications to argue that non-Malays, with their non-native ancestral origins, should
not expect equal treatment in terms of political entitlement and status. Comprehensive
implementation of the ethnic-based preferential policies after 1969 and the introduction of a
National Culture Policy were translated progressively into institutional entrenchment of Malay
political primacy justified on the basis of indigeneity.
Another ideological strand which emerged from the late 1970s and can be understood as a
variant of ketuanan Melayu is summed up in the term used from time to time by politicians from
the Islamic party, PAS: daulah Islamiyya [Islamic souvereignty]. It is an endeavor to render
Islamic principles as the encompassing reference for governance. Though pioneered by PAS,
the idea made significant inroads during the eighties following the introduction of a myriad of
measures in the name of islamization policies under premier Dr. Mahathir. These state-led
initiatives such as the expansion of Islamic bureaucracy and Syariah institutions led to the
mainstreaming of the ideology of Malaysia as a negara Islam. This had a generalized impact on
policies implemented by various state institutional actors, including those in the national
education system, to be elaborated in the latter part of this paper. Institutional mutations were
effected by the interplay of various factors.
In the judiciary system, for instance, blatant political interference by the Executive
weakened judiciary autonomy. This was compounded by the constitutional amendment
inserting Article 121[1A] in 1988, subsequently eroding the role of civil courts as the ultimate
adjudicator of inter-religious litigations. A senior law professor, Shad Saleem Faruqi,
characterized this evolving trend in the judiciary system as a case of “silent re-writing of the
Constitution,” undermining critically the originally “secular”2) foundation of the nation.
東南アジア研究 47巻 1 号
34
The political weight of the discourse of the supremacy of Islam is increasingly felt in so far
as political contests over inter-religious disputes are concerned, pitching non-Muslim socio-
political actors against Muslims (except for a handful of Malay personalities who look beyond
ethnicity and religion). In this regard, there does not appear to be a major divide among
dominant Malay politicians, be they from the ruling BN or the opposition Pakatan Rakyat.
Therefore, while the general elections last year may have been described as a “tectonic
change” by some, and have indeed transformed the Malaysian political landscape in some ways,
there may not be a paradigm shift as far as the politics of national identity is concerned.
Granted, the slogan of ketuanan rakyat [people’s supremacy] introduced by the opposition leader,
Anwar Ibrahim, may potentially discredit the ideological assertion of ketuanan Melayu.
Nonetheless, prospects to resolve equitably inter-religious problems remain uncertain even
with an eventual historic change of government.
Due to the limit of space, events leading to the transition of the above-mentioned two stages
will be outlined briefly3). The bulk of my analysis will then focus on the situations from the
1990s till present.
The Politics of Ambiguity
The seeds of contradiction are sown at the birth of the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO), the most powerful Malay political party in the country from independence. UMNO
came into being in 1946 under the impetus of the Anti-Malayan Union Movement based on this
ideological understanding of ketuanan Melayu. Its founding president, Dato’ Onn Jaafar, once
said that the UMNO movement did not adhere to any ideology other than Melayuisme
[Mohammad Yunus Hamidi 1961: 126], defined by scholar Ariffin Omar [1993] as “the belief that
the interests of the bangsa Melayu must be upheld over all else” [ibid.: 52].
Disregarding the objective, multi-ethnic socio-historical reality of the peninsula,4) this
aspiration of “Malaya for the Malays” becomes a baggage whereby building national unity
becomes a challenging exercise of managing the contradictions generated by mutually
exclusive political demands. This challenge is to haunt all the successive UMNO national
2) The Alliance memorandum submitted to the Reid Constitutional Commission stated that, “The religion
of (Malaya) shall be Islam. The observance of this principle shall not impose any disability on non-
Muslim nationals professing and practising their own religions and shall not imply that the State is not a
secular State.” [Stockwell 1995: 316, emphasis added]
3) Elaboration of my argument and analysis of this period is detailed in Chapters 3.1 [The Entrenchment of
Malay Hegemony] and 3.2 [From Malay Dilemma to Muslim Dilemma] of Ting [2007].
4) Any nation-of-intent for the nascent independent Malaya has to grapple with the fact that about half of
the domiciled population then was non-Malay, with the majority of them locally born. These locally born
non-Malays were habitually recognized as the subjects of the Malay ruler of their respective state
[Carnell 1952: 510; Sinnadurai 1978: 72; Lau 1991: 17]. Advocates of Melayuism disregarded this de facto
legal reality, insisting to admit non-Malays as citizens under re-defined, highly restrictive conditions.
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leaders who needed to be engaged with the pragmatic politics of governance in cooperation
with other ethnic-based parties5) within the framework of the Alliance, while consolidating their
own powerbase in UMNO.
The earliest generation of the Alliance national leaders shared a relatively liberal
orientation of Western political philosophy. English-educated, these Malay, Indian and Chinese
elites were well placed to negotiate independence from the British. However, they did not
command full influence over the lower state and local levels of leadership, who came from a
more tradition-bound, community-oriented background [Von Vorys 1976: 253].
On the other hand, Malay politicians outside UMNO, having been exempted from the
burden of pragmatic governance, took a greater liberty in manipulating ethnic sentiments in
order to bolster their own political credentials among Malay supporters. Melayuism thrived in
this dialectical competition among Malay politicians to be its most “authentic” champion.
Subsequently, it could be argued that the essence of Malay politics became dominated by
competing interpretations of what a faithful translation of Melayuism entails [Ting 2007: 194-
195].
As a consequence, the Alliance politicians tended to avoid making a clear public stand, if not
contradictory stands at different occasions, on ethnically divisive issues.6) They preferred
backroom negotiations and compromise in order to minimize public contentions.7) This lack of
transparency, even inconsistency, of UMNO national leaders led to different people holding
contradictory perceptions vis-à-vis these personalities, as well as interpretation of political
reality.
This dynamic is an important point to bear in mind in analyzing the politics of national
identity in Malaysia. Even though some people may argue that practical compromises are
what ultimately count, the divisive impacts of an exclusivist ideological affirmation in the public
sphere cannot be overstated, especially when made by those in positions of power. It
generates a social dynamic of its own beyond the intentions of the governing politicians. After
all, the discursive dimension is primordial in the representation of a nation as an “imagined
community.”
The Drift from Middle Ground and Bureaucratic
Entrenchment of Melayuism
Among the Alliance leaders, the initial spirit of equal partnership gradually lapsed into an
incremental political dominance of UMNO after the historic electoral victory of the Alliance in
5) They were the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Upon the
formation of the Federation of Malaysia, the word “Malayan” was changed to “Malaysian.”
6) For instance, Funston [1980] was puzzled by the “contradiction between UMNO’ s ideological and
practical approach to non-Malays” [ibid.: 139-140].
7) Horowitz [1989] called it “palace politics,” defined by him as “quiet negotiations among a few decision-
makers at the top of the system” [ibid.: 253-254].
東南アジア研究 47巻 1 号
36
the 1955 Federal elections. Fernando [2002] observed that consequently, “the MCA’s influence
was subdued, being reliant more on the goodwill of their UMNO colleagues than on their
political bargaining power” [ibid. 168]. The subsidiary position of MCA national leaders vis-à-
vis UMNO president was made crystal clear when Tan Siew Sin managed to take over the
national presidency of MCA from his more assertive rival, Lim Chong Eu, assisted by blatant
interventions from UMNO president, Tunku Abdul Rahman [Means 1976].
Pro-Malay rhetoric among UMNO politicians also became more pronounced after the
general elections in 1959, when PAS gained ground on the East Coast of Malaya at the expense
of UMNO political influence. Socio-economic and infrastructural programs involving
substantial financial resources were initiated to improve the conditions of the Malay community
[Von Vorys 1976: 224-229; Milne and Mauzy 1978: 321-324]. Ethnic preferential policies were
also implemented in earnest in the public sector and in education, adding to a non-Malay sense of
deprivation and unhappiness [Takei et al. 1973]. Despite so, Malay elites regarded these
measures as inadequate. Tussles over the use of which languages would be the official ones as
the medium of instruction in national secondary schools, fuelled further interethnic dissensions
[Roff 1967].
The 1969 general elections were conducted in this electrified atmosphere of tension.
Subsequently, the Alliance returned to form the Federal government but lost its two-thirds
majority. PAS retained Kelantan and regained Terengganu, while the opposition party,
Gerakan, took over Penang state assembly. For several days, there was uncertainty as to
whether the Alliance would continue to govern the states of Perak and Selangor. During the
evening of 13th May, anti-Chinese riots erupted from the front gate of Harun Idris, the
prospective Selangor Menteri Besar’ s house. A State of Emergency was declared, and
Parliament was suspended. Army personnel were dispatched to maintain peace and order.8)
The situation was brought under control within a few days, but the social scars took a long time
to heal.
For at least three months, brewing resentment among Chinese residents in Kuala Lumpur
led to an almost complete boycott of Malay stalls, retailers, coffee shops and other economic
dealings [Means 1991: 9; Reid 1969: 273; Slimming 1969: 73]. There were accusations that the
army personnel were partial towards the Malay trouble makers, even committing unwarranted
acts of violence themselves against innocent Chinese civilians [Slimming 1969: 36, 77]. On the
other hand, many Malays, with a heightened communal consciousness, faulted non-Malays for
their “ungratefulness,” for not “knowing their place” and how to “give-and-take.” Malay social
actors such as politicians, conservative civil servants and campus student leaders manifested an
increased assertiveness in the public sphere [Funston 1980: 225].
Under the vehement charge of young Dr. Mahathir Mohamed who laid the blame of the
situation squarely on the Tunku, the “ultra-nationalist” faction within UMNO gained ground.
The Tunku retreated to the background to give way to his deputy, Abdul Razak Hussein.
8) Cf. Von Vorys [1976] for further details of this period.
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Razak walked a tight rope in his delicate power-balancing maneuver. On the one hand, he
brought back moderate Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman to be his deputy. On the other hand, the new
regime under the premiership of Razak openly and repeatedly affirmed Malay political primacy
through UMNO.
Razak consolidated the political position of UMNO by enlarging the governing coalition
(renamed Barisan Nasional, or BN) through the co-optation of opposition parties controlling the
various states. He delineated the Chinese-dominated electoral constituencies in the greater
Kuala Lumpur area, deemed “anti-government,” as the Federal Territory, to avoid a repeat of
the 1969 electoral results for Selangor state [Cheah 2002: 123, 155].
The decades of the 1970s and 1980s saw the progressive entrenchment of a political culture
affirming Malay primacy in the public sphere and in terms of state institutional practices.9)
Razak acquiesced to the formulation of the controversial National Culture Policy that asserts
the primacy of the indigenous (reads, Malay) culture and Islam in the definition of “National
Culture.” In the name of National Culture Policy, arbitrary enforcement of restrictive cultural
policies by related state agencies who applied their own ideas of how they could serve the cause
of Melayuism, provoked incidents of protests and discontentment [Milne and Mauzy 1978: 370;
Horowitz 1989: 261, Kua 1990: 230].
Of far reaching impact was the launch of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Much as ethnic
preferential policies had already been implemented in many sectors during the sixties, its scale
of ramification in the society escalated to an unprecedented level. The NEP succeeded in
transforming the socio-economic conditions of the Malay community within a generation.
Unfortunately, the NEP also became a pawn in the games among UMNO politicians clamoring
for fast-track political promotion or seeking a share of the ever-expanding economic rent
[Horowitz 1989: 269]. Disbursement of state resources and the running of the public sector
became enmeshed with the logic of ethnic preferential treatment [Shamsul 1988]. Justified in
the name of “special position” of the Malays without understanding the original spirit behind,
ethnic preferential treatment came to be perceived increasingly as a matter of birthright among
a section of its beneficiaries [Ong 1990; 2007]. Conversely, non-Malays who raised critical
questions on such practices were perceived as challenging the principle of ketuanan Melayu.
There was a sea change in the general political atmosphere. It is instructive that within a
decade or so, the ban on the contentious book written by Dr. Mahathir in the aftermath of the
racial riots, The Malay Dilemma, was lifted, while its author rose to become the Prime Minister
of Malaysia. Immensely popular among the lower rank UMNO leaders and members as well
as the younger generation of Malay university leaders [Funston 1980], his nation-view as
articulated in The Malay Dilemma is reflective of the underlying ideological perspective behind
the growing assertion of Melayuism. In his book, he argues that Malays as the original or
indigenous people of the land (what he called, “the definitive people”) are the rightful owners of
Malaya. This gives the Malays “certain inalienable rights over the forms and obligations of
9) Funston [1980] relates how there was an open affirmation of Malay political primacy through UMNO in
the aftermath of 1969.
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citizenship which can be imposed on citizens of non-indigenous origin” [ibid.: 133].
Soon after Dr. Mahathir became the Prime Minister in 1981, he introduced the Islamization
Policy [Hussin 1990; 1993]. A plethora of measures with the declared intention to “inculcate
Islamic values in the administration of the government” and to “Islamize” the state institutions
were implemented. The mainstreaming of the idea of islamization of state institutions as a
matter of policy legitimized personal initiatives of government officials who wanted to affirm a
dominant role of Islam in the conduct of public affairs. They may or may not have been
influenced by mass-based Islamist movements who had been propagating for incremental
islamization of the public institutions and society from around mid-seventies.
Whether it was a case of “over-successful” endeavor or the fallout from riding on the “tiger”
by Dr. Mahathir in his efforts to rein in political Islam, a new ideological thread of ketuanan
Islam grew in strength parallel to the institutional entrenchment of officials imbued with
ketuanan Melayu thinking in the public sector.
A memorandum10) submitted by a large number of Indian associations in 1984 raised alarm
regarding growing incidences of Malay or religious teachers in national schools imposing
Islamic practices on non-Muslim pupils. The memorandum made a list of complaints in this
regard, including non-Muslim Indian pupils being pressured to wear Malay/Muslim style school
uniform and Hindu pupils being subject to Islamic indoctrination. Complaints were also
directed at training workshops organized for government servants, whereby Islamic religious
values and beliefs were presented as superior to other religions and cultures [No. 9.9 [4]]. They
expressed their anxiety that “there are politicians, government servants, academicians and
religious leaders who have already decided for themselves the future status of Malaysia as an
Islamic State” [No. 7]. This situation was going to worsen during the following decades.
The Nineties: Not Quite the End of Ethnic Politics
From the point of view of the politics of national identity, the 1990s seems to be an anomaly of
the longer term trend, in particular in terms of the seemingly more inclusive and
accommodative official discourse pronounced in the public sphere. On the other hand, I would
like to argue that in terms of state institutional practices, changes were superficial and at best
selective. In effect, if the state of the affairs in the national education system as well as the
judiciary system that we will be looking into is taken as a yardstick, the state-initiated
liberalization and promotion of a more multicultural image of a Malaysian nation during the
nineties had not rendered these state institutions more inclusive.
In 1991, Dr. Mahathir set the goal for Malaysia to attain the status of a developed country
by the year 2020 as the national project. Building a united nation of bangsa Malaysia with a
sense of shared destiny is listed as one of the challenges to be confronted in order to achieve
10) The memorandum was a response to the call by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in 1981 to
evaluate the implementation of the National Culture Policy during the previous decades. It is reprinted
as one of the appendices in Kua [1990: 256-270], from which I am quoting.
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such goal.
A series of changes in government policy which may be construed broadly as “cultural
liberalization” vis-à-vis the non-Malays took place during the first half of the 1990s.
Symbolically significant was the 180 degrees turnaround of official obstructionism against the
performance of lion dances that stirred up much ruckus during the 1980s. Dr. Mahathir even
personally officiated a Chinese lion dance competition, which was given extensive publicity in
the Chinese press. The cultural practices of non-Malays were accorded a greater place in the
public sphere, on such occasions as the national day celebrations, the Penang Pesta, the Malaysia
Fest and the Visit Malaysia Year campaign. Understanding it in the context of a switch
towards “a more inclusive notion of nationhood” [Loh 2002: 28], Loh nonetheless acknowledges
the possibility that this shift could just be part of the strategy to attract tourist dollars.
A significant contributing factor to the change in the “state scripting of the nation” during
the 1990s appears to be the need for Malaysia to overcome challenges posed by forces of
globalization in order to scale to a greater height on the world stage [Bunnell 2002: 110].
A policy change of practical significance for many non-Malays was allowing the
establishment of local private institutions of higher learning on a greater scale, which enabled
thousands of non-Malay youth to further their studies locally [Loh 2002]. The cheaper
educational expenses involved lightening the financial burden of lower middle class parents and
relieving unmet non-Malay demands for tertiary education. The government justified in
pragmatic terms the move as the reduction of a financial drain from the country to universities
overseas. In a bid to promote Malaysia as a regional center of higher education, the
government exempted the use of national language as the medium of instruction in these
private centers of tertiary learning.
There were several official efforts of “re-packaging” to promote a more multicultural image
of a Malaysian nation. During occasions such as National Day celebrations or major festival
celebrations, government advertisements on national unity were broadcast repeatedly on
television that depicted multi-ethnic interaction and interethnic friendship, mutual tolerance
and ethnic conviviality. In conjunction with these festivals, politicians would sponsor open
house receptions including feasts and cultural performances for people from all walks of life.
The government also launched a patriotic campaign with the slogan Malaysia boleh! [literally,
Malaysia can [do]!] in the late 1990s. Commenting on these “nation-building” initiatives, Lee
[2004] felt that “since the late 1980s,” ethnic differences.
“have been promoted as a captivating feature of Malaysian society, a source of unity in diversity that
dovetailed with the Vision 2020 agenda. Racial discourse was construed as a discourse centering on
the triumph of Malaysian democracy in which acceptance, tolerance, and integration became the
themes for the development of an equitable society” [ibid.: 133].
The MCA capitalized on the theme of bangsa Malaysia during their 1995 general elections,
which was presented as an ethnically inclusive idea of the Prime Minister [Loh 2002: 33]. The
impressive swing of Chinese votes in support of Chinese-based BN parties in the 1995 general
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elections was generally interpreted as the Chinese community warming up to a more favorable
policy reorientation by the government in the fields of the economy, culture and education [ibid.;
Gomez 1996].
The huge victory of BN in the 1995 electoral contests led to the speculation by scholars as
to whether the Malaysian nation has finally come of age and was seeing the end of ethnic
politics. Loh [2002] argued that the politics of ethnicism prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s
has been replaced by a greater emphasis on the discourse of “developmentalism.” Nonetheless,
apart from selective measures of “liberalization,” decades old ethnic preferential policies in
bureaucratic practices remain largely intact. My case study analysis in the coming section on
state institutional practices during the same period will demonstrate that ethnicism expressed
in the form of religious biases has in fact worsened during this “post-NEP” era.
The Reformasi Movement and its Aftermath
The euphoric feelings during the 1990s ended unexpectedly with the spectacular Asian
financial meltdown in 1997. Even more significant than the economic downturn that occurred
was the political turmoil following the sacking and imprisonment of the Deputy Prime Minister
then, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998. The incident provoked a great number of Malaysians, especially
the Malays, to manifest on the street their indignation and protest against the high-handed and
blatant manner a political opponent was victimized using state institutional machinery, with
impunity. This has led to the convergence of a multiethnic front of social forces upholding
universalistic values for democratic and civic governance.
Intra-Malay class contentions have seen the rise and fall of dissenting voices and intensified
power struggles within UMNO since the late 1980s. It took the massive revolt against the
system perceived as excessively authoritarian and corrupt during the Reformasi time for the
emergence of a more “durable” Malay-based multiethnic party, the Parti Keadilan Nasional
(literally, the National Justice Party; hereafter, KeADILan). A significant feature to note is the
fact that KeADILan as a Malay-dominated party espouses an ideology which is not based on
ethnicity or religion. Its party motto is “equity for all,” and affirms specifically that the special
position for the Malays and natives in Sabah and Sarawak would only be applied to raise the
socio-economic status of those who are poor and needy (KeADILan Party Constitution).
From the point of view of our analysis on the politics of national identity, the movement also
gave visibility to a section of Malays who demonstrate a greater openness to embrace
multiculturalism. Notwithstanding criticisms of the reproduction of the “old culture of politics”
by former UMNO members in KeADILan, many common people drawn into political
involvement by the momentous events were attracted by the ethnically inclusive and
democratic discourses espoused by the deposed Anwar Ibrahim during his tour around the
country to clear his name before his arrest. In addition, many social activists from non-
governmental organizations also contributed formidably to the leadership of the Reform
Movement [Weiss 2005].
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The results of the 1999 general elections registered a substantial swing of Malay protest
votes against UMNO, but mainly to the benefit of PAS. Comparatively, KeADILan that
contested mainly in ethnically mixed seats did not do as well as anticipated. The carrot (an
avalanche of electoral goodies) and scare (the prospects of Islamic rule pushed by PAS within
BA or the Barisan Alternatif, and the threat of a repeat of 1969 riots should BN lost power)
campaign tactics of BN targeting non-Malays seem to have been fairly successful.
These ethnically lopsided electoral results underline the need to mobilize voters from all
ethnic groups in order to achieve a greater democratization of the Malaysian politics. It also
drives home the point that non-Malay votes could be decisive in the event when there is a
serious political cleavage within the Malay community. At some point, the strengthening of
the opposition parties under the banner of the BA in the aftermath of the 1999 elections even
spurred some BN leaders to entertain the idea of merging BN component parties into a
multiethnic party. Nonetheless, the Mahathir regime opted for a different path. The
government managed to paralyze KeADILan by imprisonment without trial its key leaders
under the Internal Security Act. BA also fell apart when the Chinese-based Democratic
Action Party (DAP) left the coalition in protest against the Islamic State agenda pushed by PAS.
In the meantime, any lingering illusion for evolving towards a more inclusive bangsa
Malaysiawas dashed when controversies over suqiu broke out. Suqiu, meaning “appeal,” is the
Chinese acronym for an electoral memorandum signed by more than 2,000 Chinese associations
and circulated among political parties for endorsement during the 1999 general elections.
UMNO Youth organized demonstrations to protest against the memorandum as a tactic to
divert attention from the weakened political position of UMNO following their massive loss of
electoral support. At the center of contention was the suggestion to do away with the
distinction between Bumiputera [Malaysians of indigenous descent] and non-Bumiputera, and
the proposal to replace the NEP with needs-based affirmative action. The suqiu committee
was subsequently pressurized by UMNO youth wing to withdraw some of these requests
deemed as “seditious.”
The all-time low popularity of Dr. Mahathir among the Malay populace subsequently led to
his decision to retire from active politics. His handpicked successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi,
astutely integrated the reform agenda pushed by the reform movement and the opposition as
his own, and secured the biggest ever electoral victory of BN in 2004. Abdullah nonetheless
could not deliver his electoral promises of reforms due to fierce resistance from senior UMNO
stewards within his own cabinet. His indecisive political style also allowed certain emboldened
UMNO leaders to make racist and incendiary remarks against non-Malays with impunity. Not
only was he unable to carry through reforms of the police force authoritatively, he also could not
resolve speedily and effectively inter-religious conflicts arising from contentious judiciary
deliberations.
Widespread frustration and dissatisfaction set the stage for an unexpected seismic change
in the political landscape of the country during the 2008 March general elections. The BN was
returned with a much reduced majority in the Parliament, but lost control of four state
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governments in addition to Kelantan which was retained by PAS.
The election results emboldened the de facto leader of KeADILan, Anwar Ibrahim, to
articulate further his espousal of a new politics of multiculturalism. The unprecedented
political gain made by KeADILan electoral candidates prompted political observers to note that
their pledge to replace the NEP with needs-based affirmative action did not seem to be a
political liability among Malay voters. The night the electoral results were known, an elated
Anwar remarked,
The people have voted decisively for a new era where the government must be truly inclusive and
recognize that all Malaysians, regardless of race, culture or religion are a nation of one.
Even more significantly, on the eve of the expiry of an official ban on his political participation,
Anwar Ibrahim declared to a crowd of some 20,000 people gathered at Kelab Sultan Sulaiman in
Kampung Baru, that it was time to replace the ideology of ketuanan Melayu propagated by
UMNO with ketuanan rakyat. He also assured the majority Malay crowd that while political
coalition led by him would champion the rights of all Malaysians, the constitutional rights of the
Malays would be protected [“Kampung Baru hails ‘ketuanan Rakyat.’” Malaysiakini, April 16,
2008].
The opposition parties, named as Pakatan Rakyat (PR), were given a once-a-lifetime chance
to dirty their hands in local governance. In several states, the PR-led state governments,
among other things, initiated a policy of open tender for projects, issued permanent land titles to
long-term Chinese residents in new villages (as well as to Malay villagers), and appointed some
non-Malays to important official positions.
Put on the defensive, UMNO-controlled Malay newspaper, Utusan Malaysia, spared no
efforts in whipping up a sense of insecurity among the Malay community with the message that
Malay rights are under threat. Elements within UMNO and various conservative Malay social
pressure groups have also been vocal over what they perceive as non-Malay challenges to the
special position of Malays and the position of Islam.
The significant electoral setback has led to national leadership revamp of major component
parties of BN. Dissident voices among the rank and file revolt against what they perceived as
incompetent leadership, calling for the latter to face up to their responsibility over the electoral
defeats. Premier Abdullah was subsequently pressured to step down by his critics within the
party.
The strong gain made by the opposition, including KeADILan, has raised the hope for the
emergence of a credible two-party system. Subsequent by-elections conducted over the past
one year also saw an increase in margins of majority gained by PR candidates. Nonetheless,
partnership among PR party leaders appears to remain delicate. Much groundwork remains
to be done and compromise to be sorted out among the three component parties in order for a
more coherent working platform and coalition ideology to be forged. In addition, PR will have
to seize this window of opportunity to prove their mettle in governance so as to persuade the
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voters to renew and even enlarge their electoral mandate in a few years to come.
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Reforms
Mere adaptation in public ritualistic practices and media propaganda described earlier are
insufficient to forge a greater national unity. A far greater challenge confronted by any
political reformers intending to foster a more inclusive Malaysian nationhood is an effective
revamp of institutional practices and cultures which are ideologically imbued with the so-called
Melayuism, and now ever more so with its Siamese twin, ketuanan Islam. The two most
prominent examples of state institutions that have in recent years come under public scrutiny
are in this respect the “islamization” of national schools and the incremental disempowerment
of non-Muslims in seeking judiciary recourse for inter-religious litigations involving a Muslim
party.
The “Islamization” of the National Schools
In recent years, anecdotal evidence of ethnic discrimination against non-Malay pupils in national
school has surfaced time and again.11) Within state institutions, the perception of ethnic
discrimination remained unchanged throughout the nineties. For instance, teachers in Chinese
primary schools interviewed around the mid-1990s continued to think that the ethnic
discrimination practiced by the government worked against the emergence of a common
identity among all Malaysians [Glad 1998: 201]. The fieldwork of Joseph [2006] during the
1990s indicated that resentment against the educational quota system was still vividly felt
among non-Malay teenage girls studying in secondary schools, while Malay schoolgirls
constructed their ethnic discourse around the affirmative action policy. Non-Malay teachers in
national schools are aware that despite fulfilling professional criteria, their chances of promotion
are limited. The Malay-dominated teaching staff in the national school system have grown
accustomed to a system of rewards and promotion whereby ethnic criteria weighs far more
over professional merits. Even the term ketuanan Melayu itself has found its way into the most
recent version of secondary history textbooks. The Form Four history textbook was also
significantly revamped to switch focus from world civilization to Islamic civilization [Ting 2009].
There appears to be a conflation of the logic of ketuanan Melayu with that of ketuanan Islam.
11) Complaints have been voiced by parents in the letter column of newspapers irregularly, and in recent
years, on discussion blogs on the internet. This reality was also voiced by some disgruntled parents,
retired teachers and ex-pupils at the height of the controversies surrounding the claim by the National
Union of Teaching Profession (NUTP) that around 10 per cent of national schools in the country
practised “racial segregation” or ethnic-based streaming of classes. Complaints which surfaced
included the naming of classes using racial slurs such as 4K which is known as “4 Keling” (Keling is a
derogatory term in Malay for Indians), discrimination in the award of prizes for educational excellence, a
case where all the Indian pupils were placed together with Indonesian pupils [“Segregation complaints
cast doubts on committee’s credibility,” Malaysiakini, March 26, 2002; “Disgruntled parents not told
about school probe.” Malaysiakini, March 27, 2002].
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We have already mentioned the complaints of Indian associations dating back as early as
1984 regarding the disrespect and religious insensitivity shown by some Malay teachers and
national school administrators towards Hindu pupils. The extent of such problems appears to
have become even more rampant and widespread during the subsequent decades. Grievances
are directed at the inconsiderate imposition of Islamic prayers or rituals in the running of the
schools, in disregard of the minority presence of non-Muslim pupils. The overzealousness of
some school principals and religious teachers in regulating the wearing of headscarves by
Muslim female pupils put off even Malay parents who are more liberal-minded.
It is noted that most of the teachers teaching Moral Education (a compulsory examination
subject for non-Muslims from 1993) are Muslims and that “there is a natural tendency for a bias
towards Islam” [Maureen Chew, “Islamisation and the Decline of Mission Schools,” CANews,
July 2003, p.p. 10]. This was previously compensated by having the students joining religion-
based clubs in schools. The 1995 Education Act omitted religious clubs from its list of
authorized organizations to be formed in schools. Accordingly, a senior officer in the Education
Ministry issued a directive to ban all religious societies in schools. Notable is the reasoning
applied to justify the ban. The circular stated that given the fact that Islam was the national
religion, all the other religions were not supposed to be allowed in schools [Abdul Razak Baginda
and Schier 2003: 100-102].
In December 2002, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir admitted that the school system had been
“hijacked” and that Islamic practices had been introduced into the schools such that non-
Muslims felt alienated and were turned away from it. At another occasion, he lamented that
national schools had become like “religious Malay schools” (sekolah Melayu agama) [“Sekolah
kebangsaan diperbetul.” Utusan Malaysia, February 14, 2003].
In a dialogue on the trend of “islamization” in schools in January 2003, the Director General
of the Ministry of Education, Abdul Rafie Mahat, admitted his concern that “national schools
have become too dominant, not only in terms of the number of Malays, but also in the character
it brings up.” He nevertheless stressed that it was “a case of the hands and the other limbs doing
different things from the head, contrary to what the Ministry desires” [Abdul Razak Baginda
and Schier 2003: 75]. Admitting the failure of the role of national schools in fostering ethnic
integration, Premier Abdullah Badawi announced during the Malaysian Education summit in
April 2004 a series of reform measures12) to rectify their weaknesses. It is yet to be seen that
these remedial steps are effective in correcting problematic situations in national schools.
12) Among others, reform measures planned by the government include: introducing Arabic, Mandarin and
Tamil as subjects; increasing the number of non-Malay principals; making teachers sensitive to multi-
racialism; and enhancing the interaction of national schools with national-type schools [Malaysiakini,
April 27, 2004].
INGH. T : The Politics of National Identity in West Malaysia
45
Disempowerment of Non-Muslims in Seeking Judicial Redress Concerning Inter-religious
Litigations
Conclusions in 2008 by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into The V.K. Lingam Video Clip13)
have confirmed longstanding public perception of how corrupted the judiciary system in
Malaysia has become due to excessive political interference. Setting aside the general state of
the judiciary crisis, of relevance to our concern here is how many of the deliberations involving
inter-religious litigations made by Muslim judges in the civil court have been perceived to be
increasingly biased against non-Muslims. At the source of various difficulties in this case is the
gradual evolution in the interpretation of Article 121[1A] of the Federal Constitution, which
stipulates that civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the
jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.”14)
Right after the clause was inserted, civil courts at the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s
still upheld their general jurisdiction except in cases judged to fall expressly within the
jurisdiction of the Syariah court [“Fighting legal illiteracy.” The Sun, January 6, 2006].
However, during the 1990s, Muslim judges in the civil courts increasingly declined to adjudicate
inter-religious disputes over religious matters, citing Article 121[1A]. This has indirectly
widened the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court at the expense of the civil court.
One legal case which caught the attention of various civil groups was that of S. Shamala a/p
Sathiyaseelan.15) Shamala found out that her husband whom she married under Hindu rites in
1998 converted to Islam in 2002. Not only did he take a second [Muslim] wife, he also converted
their two young children without informing Shamala. She filed for divorce and applied for the
custody of the children, seeking declaration that their conversion was null and void without her
consent. In April 2004, the High Court deliberated to abstain from adjudicating on the
conversion of Shamala’s children, but instructed her to bring them up as Muslims. Sixteen non-
governmental organizations, concerned about the progressive deterioration of the role of civil
court in upholding constitutional fundamental rights, decided to form a group known as Article
11, named after the section of the Federal Constitution providing for the guarantee of
individuals’ freedom of religion.
The controversial case which subsequently generated the most emotions and mobilization
was that of Maniam Moorthy, an army commando who became paralyzed after a military
13) A senior lawyer was video-taped to be in telephonic conversation with someone whom he informed
would be appointed as the new Chief Justice thanks to his lobbying work.
14) The constitutional amendment was rushed through the Parliament: tabled for the first reading on
March 17, 1988, and passed the next day.
15) Information provided on the case has been reported widely in local media. The author also attended a
seminar organised by Article 11 held on June, 26, 2004 whereby testimonies of parties involved were
made. The court verdict delivered in April 2004 may be found at http://www.cljlaw.com/public/cotw-
041126.htm. A local socio-political magazine, Aliran Monthly, also carried an article analyzing the case:
“Justice and Jurisdictions―The Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Dr. Jeyaganesh C Mograrajah (Muhammad
Ridzuan) custody case” by Rizal bin Chek Hashim [Aliran Monthly 2004: 7].
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training accident in August 1998. In November 2005, he fell and incurred serious head injuries,
and died on December 20, 2005. While he was already in coma, his startled wife, Sinnasamy
Kaliammal, was told by the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Affairs Council that Moorthy
converted to Islam two years earlier. Kaliammal who was never informed of his conversion,
claimed that he continued to eat pork and attend Hindu religious rites. At his death, the 30-
year-old widow filed an application at the High Court seeking to claim his body for burial
according to Hindu rites. The Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council then obtained an ex
parte [unilateral] application at the Syariah High Court to declare that Moorthy had converted
and died a Muslim and should be buried accordingly. On 28 December 2005, without looking
into the evidence presented by Kaliammal, Mohd. Raus Sharif, the presiding Appellate and
Special Powers High Court Judge, declared, “The Civil Court does not have the power to make a
judicial review on the Syariah Court order, nor to ignore or nullify it.” Feelings of sympathy
and indignation for Kaliammal was heightened by the fact that she had suffered silently for
seven years since Moorthy became paralyzed, attending faithfully to his needs and difficulties.
A Hindu Rights Action Force [Hindraf] regrouping of more than 50 Hindu associations was
formed rapidly in response to the court decision. Their aim was to carry out lobbying work
with political parties to push for permanent and equitable solution to such problems and a whole
array of other social issues confronted by the Indian community. Despite their unsuccessful
lobbying work, almost 20,000 people turned out when they organized a mass demonstration in
November 2007 in Kuala Lumpur to manifest their protest against marginalization and
discrimination experienced by the community. The key leaders of Hindraf were subsequently
detained without trial under the Internal Security Act, only to be released in May 2009. It was
this intense feeling of anger and widespread sense of frustration towards the unjust treatment
faced by the community which has led to the spectacular defeat of all major MIC national
leaders during the March 2008 general elections.
Conclusions
Are we at a critical stage of Malaysian history from the point of view of the politics of national
identity? There appears to be a mixed record of instances of setbacks and progress from the
point of view of prospects to achieve a greater national unity. Even though many put a lot of
hope in the new possibilities opened up by an eventual takeover of PR, the scenario ahead is not
as clear-cut. Small stepping stones have appeared which may subsequently form a patchy
path leading to a greater consensus on a more inclusive representation of Malaysian national
identity. But the larger picture is less optimistic, especially in terms of the assertion of the
superior position of Islam as the official religion over other religions.
Anwar Ibrahim, the designated Prime-Minister-in-waiting of the opposition coalition,
appears to be circumspect in applying his multiculturalist position when it comes to the
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religious realm.16) Despite the openness of PAS on specific issues such as vernacular
education, its Islamic ideology of Daulah Islamiyyah is arguably a religious variant of the same
logic of Melayuism. PAS party stewards have been at the forefront as “defenders of Islam”
against social groups such as Article 11 or the Bar Council who raised the alarm regarding the
failure of the civil court to uphold constitutional fundamental rights.
An important variable which is not integrated into my analysis is the evolution of politics in
Sabah and Sarawak. They are in fact the pillars propping up the governing BN after the 2008
elections. Given the very different cultural, socio-political and demographic contexts, their
eventual politicization and assertion of more political influence could bring about significant
changes in the equation of the politics of national identity.
On the other hand, my analysis has demonstrated that in order to make an assessment of
the evolution of national identity, it is not sufficient to analyze solely discourses pronounced by
politicians and to examine partisan politics. Institutional practices are arguably even more
potent and tenacious in the affirmation of the inequitable worth of citizens’ status in the putative
nation. Underlying the two cases of institutional practices that we have related is the implicit
ideological understanding of the national identity by the institutional agents involved. These
practices have become so widespread and ingrained in the institutions concerned that they
cannot be rectified by mere decree enactment or policy enunciations by the governing elites.
Institutional reforms would entail persistent rectification of the work culture behind routine
practices and decisive modification of the perspectives of the state agents concerned.
However, the starting point of change may logically begin with the ideological paradigm
shift in the dynamics of political contests. From this point of view, the gaining in currency of
the bold slogan of ketuanan rakyat heralds an important milestone in national politics, especially
if PR could be consolidated sufficiently for a viable two-party system to emerge. It remains to
be seen whether PR leaders honor their political position by consistently translating it into
concrete policies, action and practices,17) and whether they would succeed in inducing similar
switch of rhetoric on the part of BN.
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